Kristen has a very g

Kristen has a very good point.  Our policies are determined by what we call something.  Sometime language can, therefore, be an obstacle to our understanding of a problem.  As you know, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism.  It is certainly a term that will evoke strong sentiments on all sides of the issue.

Lecture notes 3-29-06

Lecture notes: 3-29-06

Do terrorists come from poor background?  Or are they bunch of losers?  

Despite common perception, Jitka Maleckova finds that that is not the case.  In 1978, Russell and Miller by studying 350 individuals active in groups from Latin America, Europe, Japan found that 2/3rds came from middle to upper middle class background.

A 1999CIA [Hudson, 1999] funded study agreed with the general findings of Russell and Miller.  However, they found that while the participants from the developed countries were from affluent families, in the developing countries, such as in Latin America, they came from poorer background.

Krueger and Maleckova (2002; 2003), Sageman (2003) challenge this developed/underdeveloped dichotomy.  But Sageman found that while the people from Arab countries were better educated and middle class, the Magreb Arabs were not.  Similar studies (Hurvitz, 1998) of Hizballah, and Berrebi (2003) of Hamas and the PIJ were not from the impoverished class of Lebanese and Palestinian population, respectively.Therefore, poverty serves only as a week link to terrorism.

How about gender differences?  Although Arab/Muslim groups for a long time did not accept women in the direct involvement in guerrilla actions, the Chechnians and the Tamils relied heavily on women.  

The sight of the 9/11 attacks caused many to wonder how any rational person can do such a thing.  Many theories of motivation were offered.  Some thought that these people were brainwashed, some thought that they were acting on their personal revenge, while others theorized that it was blind religious fanaticism that serves as the root cause of suicide terrorism. Yet, as Arield Merari points out, none of them hold true when we consider the empirical evidence gathered from groups across the world.


What about the countries?  Do poor countries produce more terrorists?  There is absolutely no correlation between per capita GDP and incidents of terrorism.

What about popular support for terrorism.  Mia Bloom (2005) and others have found a strong correlation between public support for terrorism and their occurrence.

Jerrold Post finds the forces of socialization as the strongest motivating force for terrorism.  Palestinian kids from the Gaza Strip, the Catholics in Northern Ireland learn hatred from their birth.  Jerrold Post suggests that the fusion between individual identity and group identity cause acts of terrorism.  Thus, to the al-Qaeda members, a suicide attack is not “suicide.”  It is ishtihad, or an act of ultimate self-sacrifice for the cause of the group.


Looking at terrorism from a social psychological perspective, there is nothing terribly mysterious about terrorism.  The conclusion that we can draw is that there is no single profile for the terrorists.  Nor does it have a single “root cause.”  Thus, for many of us, the real mystery is the lack of mystery.

War On Terrorism Are

War On Terrorism: Are We Winning?  
Lecture by Martha Crenshaw
The war on terrorism is unlike any other military conflict in United States history and, perhaps, impossible to win, according to Martha Crenshaw.
Crenshaw, professor of government at Weselyan University, headlined the seventh installment of a semester-long lecture series about terrorism.  Her presentation to more than 250 in attendance at the March 23 event in the Hardy Tower auditorium was titled, "The War on Terrorism: Are We Winning?"
Crenshaw outlining the objectives of her presntation: discuss why a public debate on the war on terrorism is essential; explain what a counter-terrorist strategy is; define the United States strategy; and determine how the war should be evaluated.
Crenshaw said President Bush and members of his administration – particularly Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld – are unwilling to critically evaluate the risks of their policies or military strategies.  She said it is apparent that they will not consider correcting or altering their plans, no matter how much evidence suggests those plans aren’t working.
Crenshaw said a counter-terrorism strategy should have a detailed plan to reach clearly-defined goals.  She said the strategy can’t be too ambitious or grand.  It also should not have ambiguous ends.  She said the strategy should include cost and benefit projections, which would make it possible to properly calculate results.
Crenshaw evaluated the United States’ anti-terrorism strategy, starting with President Bush’s remarks following the tragic events Sept. 11, 2001 and how he immediately framed the response as a "war of terrorism."
According to Crenshaw, the current counter-terrorist strategy of military pre-emption is highly ambiguous and completely at odds with what Crenshaw stated a proper strategy should be.
She said United States policy can be defined by four tenets known as the "Four Ds:" defeat terrorism by force; deny terrorists the luxury of state sponsorships, and safe havens; diminish root causes for the support of terrorism; and defend the American homeland and American interests abroad against terrorist attacks.
Crenshaw evaluated the results for each tenet.  Although many top terrorist leaders and their followers have been killed, captured or on the run, according to Crenshaw, terrorist groups are continuing to recruit new members at a record pace.
Crenshaw said is too early to know if the strategy to deny terrorists state sponsorship is successful or not.  She said diminishing the support for terrorism has also proved problematic.  She said relief efforts following the tsunamis in South-East Asia and the earthquakes in Pakistan have done little to change the negative perception of the United States among groups that are producing terrorists.

Let me talk about an

Let me talk about another important matter.  Some of you may have seen that two of Hinduism’s holiest shrines in Varanasi, India were bombed (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4792072.stm).  Although no group has claimed responsibilities, suspicion has fallen on the Islamic extremists, particularly on the Kashmiri separatist groups.  Assuming that is the case, what do you think was the motivation(s) behind this attack, which had no military significance whatsoever?    Any thoughts?

My primary premise is that people are motivated not only by their self-interest but also by the perceived welfare of the group in which they belong. The notion of what is best for the group and what individual member must do are defined and articulated by the group leaders. Once a group leader identifies for the members who are the members and who the enemies are, it becomes a matter of process to channel the collective frustration and anger toward a specific target. We can understand genocides, civil wars and terrorism within this broad framework.

Published in 2001.