Collective Madness

2007-03-04T16:54:00.000-08:00

The world is often guilty of ignoring Africa. There are many local or regional conflicts which have the potential of threatening all of us. Marc Linville suggests that we look at the following article on Uganda. Let us know what you thik. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070302/ap_on_go_ot/us_uganda

2007-02-13T15:09:00.000-08:00

Why Do Hawks Win the Debate?

I found this very interesting article by Nobel Laureate economist Daniel Kahneman. See what you think of this.

Why Hawks Win
By Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Renshon
Page 1 of 1

January/February 2007

Why are hawks so influential? The answer may lie deep in the human mind. People have dozens of decision-making biases, and almost all favor conflict rather than concession. A look at why the tough guys win more than they should.

Elizabeth Glassanos/FOREIGN POLICY
Should Hawks Win? Matthew Continetti of the conservative Weekly Standard and Matthew Yglesias of the liberal American Prospect square off in an FP web exclusive debate. Kahneman and Renshon respond to the debate here.
National leaders get all sorts of advice in times of tension and conflict. But often the competing counsel can be broken down into two basic categories. On one side are the hawks: They tend to favor coercive action, are more willing to use military force, and are more likely to doubt the value of offering concessions. When they look at adversaries overseas, they often see unremittingly hostile regimes who only understand the language of force. On the other side are the doves, skeptical about the usefulness of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions. Where hawks see little in their adversaries but hostility, doves often point to subtle openings for dialogue.

As the hawks and doves thrust and parry, one hopes that the decision makers will hear their arguments on the merits and weigh them judiciously before choosing a course of action. Don’t count on it. Modern psychology suggests that policymakers come to the debate predisposed to believe their hawkish advisors more than the doves. There are numerous reasons for the burden of persuasion that doves carry, and some of them have nothing to do with politics or strategy. In fact, a bias in favor of hawkish beliefs and preferences is built into the fabric of the human mind.

Social and cognitive psychologists have identified a number of predictable errors (psychologists call them biases) in the ways that humans judge situations and evaluate risks. Biases have been documented both in the laboratory and in the real world, mostly in situations that have no connection to international politics. For example, people are prone to exaggerating their strengths: About 80 percent of us believe that our driving skills are better than average. In situations of potential conflict, the same optimistic bias makes politicians and generals receptive to advisors who offer highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of war. Such a predisposition, often shared by leaders on both sides of a conflict, is likely to produce a disaster. And this is not an isolated example.

In fact, when we constructed a list of the biases uncovered in 40 years of psychological research, we were startled by what we found: All the biases in our list favor hawks. These psychological impulses—only a few of which we discuss here—incline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations. In short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.

None of this means that hawks are always wrong. One need only recall the debates between British hawks and doves before World War II to remember that doves can easily find themselves on the wrong side of history. More generally, there are some strong arguments for deliberately instituting a hawkish bias. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to demand far more than a 50-50 chance of being right before we accept the promises of a dangerous adversary. The biases that we have examined, however, operate over and beyond such rules of prudence and are not the product of thoughtful consideration. Our conclusion is not that hawkish advisors are necessarily wrong, only that they are likely to be more persuasive than they deserve to be.

VISION PROBLEMS

Several well-known laboratory demonstrations have examined the way people assess their adversary’s intelligence, willingness to negotiate, and hostility, as well as the way they view their own position. The results are sobering. Even when people are aware of the context and possible constraints on another party’s behavior, they often do not factor it in when assessing the other side’s motives. Yet, people still assume that outside observers grasp the constraints on their own behavior. With armies on high alert, it’s an instinct that leaders can ill afford to ignore.

Imagine, for example, that you have been placed in a room and asked to watch a series of student speeches on the policies of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. You’ve been told in advance that the students were assigned the task of either attacking or supporting Chávez and had no choice in the matter. Now, suppose that you are then asked to assess the political leanings of these students. Shrewd observers, of course, would factor in the context and adjust their assessments accordingly. A student who gave an enthusiastic pro-Chávez speech was merely doing what she was told, not revealing anything about her true attitudes. In fact, many experiments suggest that people would overwhelmingly rate the pro-Chávez speakers as more leftist. Even when alerted to context that should affect their judgment, people tend to ignore it. Instead, they attribute the behavior they see to the person’s nature, character, or persistent motives. This bias is so robust and common that social psychologists have given it a lofty title: They call it the fundamental attribution error.

The effect of this failure in conflict situations can be pernicious. A policymaker or diplomat involved in a tense exchange with a foreign government is likely to observe a great deal of hostile behavior by that country’s representatives. Some of that behavior may indeed be the result of deep hostility. But some of it is simply a response to the current situation as it is perceived by the other side. What is ironic is that individuals who attribute others’ behavior to deep hostility are quite likely to explain away their own behavior as a result of being “pushed into a corner” by an adversary. The tendency of both sides of a dispute to view themselves as reacting to the other’s provocative behavior is a familiar feature of marital quarrels, and it is found as well in international conflicts. During the run-up to World War I, the leaders of every one of the nations that would soon be at war perceived themselves as significantly less hostile than their adversaries.

If people are often poorly equipped to explain the behavior of their adversaries, they are also bad at understanding how they appear to others. This bias can manifest itself at critical stages in international crises, when signals are rarely as clear as diplomats and generals believe them to be. Consider the Korean War, just one example of how misperception and a failure to appreciate an adversary’s assessment of intentions can lead to hawkish outcomes. In October 1950, as coalition forces were moving rapidly up the Korean Peninsula, policymakers in Washington were debating how far to advance and attempting to predict China’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was convinced that “no possible shred of evidence could have existed in the minds of the Chinese Communists about the non-threatening intentions of the forces of the United Nations.” Because U.S. leaders knew that their intentions toward China were not hostile, they assumed that the Chinese knew this as well. Washington was, therefore, incapable of interpreting the Chinese intervention as a reaction to a threat. Instead, the Americans interpreted the Chinese reaction as an expression of fundamental hostility toward the United States. Some historians now believe that Chinese leaders may in fact have seen advancing Allied forces as a threat to their regime.

CARELESSLY OPTIMISTIC

Excessive optimism is one of the most significant biases that psychologists have identified. Psychological research has shown that a large majority of people believe themselves to be smarter, more attractive, and more talented than average, and they commonly overestimate their future success. People are also prone to an “illusion of control”: They consistently exaggerate the amount of control they have over outcomes that are important to them—even when the outcomes are in fact random or determined by other forces. It is not difficult to see that this error may have led American policymakers astray as they laid the groundwork for the ongoing war in Iraq.

Indeed, the optimistic bias and the illusion of control are particularly rampant in the run-up to conflict. A hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic measures is often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly. Predictions that the Iraq war would be a “cakewalk,” offered up by some supporters of that conflict, are just the latest in a long string of bad hawkish predictions. After all, Washington elites treated the first major battle of the Civil War as a social outing, so sure were they that federal troops would rout rebel forces. General Noel de Castelnau, chief of staff for the French Army at the outset of World War I, declared, “Give me 700,000 men and I will conquer Europe.” In fact, almost every decision maker involved in what would become the most destructive war in history up to that point predicted not only victory for his side, but a relatively quick and easy victory. These delusions and exaggerations cannot be explained away as a product of incomplete or incorrect information. Optimistic generals will be found, usually on both sides, before the beginning of every military conflict.

If optimism is the order of the day when it comes to assessing one’s own chances in armed conflict, however, gloom usually prevails when evaluating another side’s concessions. Psychologically, we are receptive not only to hawks’ arguments for war but also to their case against negotiated solutions. The intuition that something is worth less simply because the other side has offered it is referred to in academic circles as “reactive devaluation.” The very fact that a concession is offered by somebody perceived as hostile undermines the content of the proposal. What was said matters less than who said it. And so, for example, American policymakers would likely look very skeptically on any concessions made by the regime in Tehran. Some of that skepticism could be the rational product of past experience, but some of it may also result from unconscious—and not necessarily rational—devaluation.

Evidence suggests that this bias is a significant stumbling block in negotiations between adversaries. In one experiment, Israeli Jews evaluated an actual Israeli-authored peace plan less favorably when it was attributed to the Palestinians than when it was attributed to their own government. Pro-Israel Americans saw a hypothetical peace proposal as biased in favor of Palestinians when authorship was attributed to Palestinians, but as “evenhanded” when they were told it was authored by Israelis.

DOUBLE OR NOTHING

It is apparent that hawks often have the upper hand as decision makers wrestle with questions of war and peace. And those advantages do not disappear as soon as the first bullets have flown. As the strategic calculus shifts to territory won or lost and casualties suffered, a new idiosyncrasy in human decision making appears: our deep-seated aversion to cutting our losses. Imagine, for example, the choice between:

Option A: A sure loss of $890

Option B: A 90 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 10 percent chance to lose nothing.

In this situation, a large majority of decision makers will prefer the gamble in Option B, even though the other choice is statistically superior. People prefer to avoid a certain loss in favor of a potential loss, even if they risk losing significantly more. When things are going badly in a conflict, the aversion to cutting one’s losses, often compounded by wishful thinking, is likely to dominate the calculus of the losing side. This brew of psychological factors tends to cause conflicts to endure long beyond the point where a reasonable observer would see the outcome as a near certainty. Many other factors pull in the same direction, notably the fact that for the leaders who have led their nation to the brink of defeat, the consequences of giving up will usually not be worse if the conflict is prolonged, even if they are worse for the citizens they lead.

U.S. policymakers faced this dilemma at many points in Vietnam and today in Iraq. To withdraw now is to accept a sure loss, and that option is deeply unattractive. The option of hanging on will therefore be relatively attractive, even if the chances of success are small and the cost of delaying failure is high.

Hawks, of course, can cite many moments in recent history when adversaries actually were unremittingly hostile and when force produced the desired result or should have been applied much earlier. The clear evidence of a psychological bias in favor of aggressive outcomes cannot decide the perennial debates between the hawks and the doves. It won’t point the international community in a clear direction on Iran or North Korea. But understanding the biases that most of us harbor can at least help ensure that the hawks don’t win more arguments than they should.

Daniel Kahneman is a Nobel laureate in economics and Eugene Higgins professor of psychology and professor of public affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Jonathan Renshon is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Harvard University and author of Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006).

Male Warrior Factor

2006-09-09T15:28:00.000-07:00

Male Warrior Factor

Someone in class asked me about the effects of groups on male behavior. I just read an article. Please look up: http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/science/09/09/warrior.effect.reut/index.html.

These findings are consistent with other research in various branches of social sciences and social psychology. Men seem to be genetically more prone toward responding with force when faced with any kind of threat. Therefore, men tend to be more militaristic, chauvinistic, and macho patriotic.

AndyS commented on m

2006-09-08T20:03:00.000-07:00

AndyS commented on my lecture note and provided an interesting observation based on a perverted logic. He asks, why the American government doesn’t say what it really means: “acts of ‘terrorism' are actions that seek to terrorize U.S civilians?” He says that may be we should not seek a global definition. What are your thoughts?

Lecture Notes 82906

2006-09-06T20:38:00.000-07:00

Lecture Notes (8/29/06)

Defining “terrorism” is problematic.  This is because the term has a strong pejorative connotation.  No group today claims to be “terrorist.”  Yet, until about 1940s, many groups would welcome this epithet as a badge of honor.

Alex Schmid studied over 100 different definitions of terrorism given by national governments, intelligence specialists and academics.  He found that most of these emphasize the i) use of force against non-combatants, ii) having a political goal, and iii) aiming at creating an atmosphere of fear among civilian population.  We may also add to it, iv) non-governmental agent (a group, as opposed to a state).

Why is it difficult to define terrorism?  It is basically a political term used to describe activities that “we” don’t like.  If we liked it, we would not have called it so.  Take for instance, use of force.  All organized countries use military against their adversaries in warfare.  On the process many innocent civilians die.  Is that terrorism?

Or, consider the attack on the USS Cole.  Since it did not involve civilian population, was it a terrorist attack?

Having a political goal is important.  This distinguishes a “terrorist” action from a criminal act.  While the former carries political goals, the latter only the motivation of making money.

What happens when a civilian target is chosen by a government to instill fear?  For instance, should we call the firebombing of Desden during the WWII or the dropping of the atomic bombs on civilian population acts of terrorism?

Finally, if we only call actions taken by a non-government group as “terrorism,” what about our support for the Contras in Nicaragua or the Mujahideens fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan?  What about the downing of the Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland by the agents of the Libyan government?

However, it is important to define terrorism, if we are to call it “illegal” and wish to fight it.  Unfortunately, as of now, the United Nations has failed to come up with a definition, which would satisfy all the governments, including our own.  At the end, “terrorism” like beauty is in the eyes of the beholder.

Questions from Parvda

2006-09-06T17:18:00.000-07:00

I was asked the following questions by a reporter of Pravda, a Slovak newspaper.  I thought I would share it with you.  Please post your comments.

What are the most visible changes in al-Qaeda organization from 9/11 till
today?

The most visible change is in the personnel of its old organizational structure.  Most of the top echelon is either dead or captured.  As a result, there are new faces.  Unfortunately, not much is known about the current organizational hierarchy.  Judging for the steady stream of media releases of bin Landen and al Zawahiri tapes, it seems that the infrastructure pipeline is still intact.

Why we are still no able to catch Osama bin Laden?

It is not unusual for a fugitive to evade arrest for a very long time, when a large segment of the population and the government apparatus protect him.  For instance, the NATO forces have not been able to capture Radco Mladich and Radovan Karadich from the heart of Europe.  How can we the expect to capture OBL from a very protective custody of the Poshtun population?  Also, I strongly suspect that within the Pakistani administration there are two groups.  The first one is happy to look the other way and seriously hope that OBL not be caught within the Pakistani territory for the following reasons:

Given his stature among the common people, no ruler of a Muslim country can be seen as a party to OBL’s capture. In that happens, the first casualty will be Parvez Musharaff himself.

Judging from past history, there is every reason to believe that the US has no long-term interest in Pakistan. As long as the threat of an enemy looms large and Pakistan is seen as a useful ally, the US will be interested in the country.

Then there is another faction within Pakistan, perhaps headed by their intelligence agency, the ISI, which is actively supporting OBL for ideological reasons.

Therefore, given the popularity of OBL and complicity of the Pakistani government, it is not at all surprising that he has not been caught yet.

How significant is his role in al-Qaeda organization in present time? Is he now only a symbol?

He is still a very large symbol of Islamic resistance against the West.  To test it, all you have to do is to go to most Islamic countries and see whose pictures the street vendors are selling.

I know it is very hard to say but what could be the most imminent terrorist
threat?

Nobody knows.  However, it seems that attacks on mass transit systems still dominate their imagination.

Do you think finding real solution of israeli-palestinian conflict could have some real impact on militant Islamist groups like al-Qaeda?

NO.  There are several reasons for that.

There is no unanimity among the Islamist militants when it comes to the nature of a “real solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Is it a two-state solution or the total destruction of the Jewish state?

What about other parts of the world where there are Islamic resurgences, such as in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Philippines, western China, etc.? Don’t they have to be solved as well?

One of the main reasons why folks like OBL took up arms was because they felt that Islam was being threatened. To them, the threats not only come from the “far enemy’ (the West in general and the US in particular), but also from the “near enemies” (the “apostate” governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt). Regardless of the resolution of Israeli issue, these will still be causes of war to the jihadis.

Are we losing or winning war against global terrorism? By the way do we really have war against global terrorism?

I am not sure if there is a “global terrorism.” It is much too complex to think of it as one single force. We may be able to manage one group or one set of ideas, but others will surely come up. Therefore, the question is not one of “winning,” it is more of “managing.” If we disregard the deaths from 9/11 attacks as an aberration, the average death rates from international terrorism for the past 40 years is holding steady at about 370 per year. In other words, the world has always lived with threats of terrorism and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

2006-07-26T16:15:00.000-07:00

The Cost of Fighting Terrorism

Dipak K. Gupta

Often there seems to be an utter disconnect between actual threats of terrorism and the state response. In terms of cold numbers, the comparison between the probabilities of death from international terrorism, where the attackers come from outside of the country, with other real dangers seems almost absurd. In the past 38 years, the MIPT RAND Corporation database records on the average 375 deaths per year worldwide. This compares with roughly the same number of people who drown in bathtubs in the US alone (about 320). Even when we add the total fatalities during the past ten years resulting from both international and domestic terrorism, the number rises to nearly 32,700, which is less than the automobile related deaths for a single year in the United States. By comparing the number of terrorism killings with those from natural disasters like the recent tsunami in the South Asia and earthquake deaths in Pakistan, the national obsession with terrorism may indeed seem Kafa-esque.
Terrorism, by its very nature, is a mixture of violence and theater. It accomplishes its immediate goal by setting a time-honored trap. This trap is for an organized society to over react. The government of the target state responds predictably, particularly when it comes to international terrorism. Facing unexpected death and destruction perpetrated by foreign nationals -- however small compared to other calamities of life -- nations all over the world experience something akin to a collective post-traumatic stress syndrome. The made-for-television violence, magnified by the media deepens our collective sense of insecurity. In this condition of national paranoia, politicians vie for being the most hawkish against the threat. In the face of such a threat no price seems high enough. Although the costs of counter-terrorism varies from the moral consideration of killing innocent civilians as a part of collateral damage to the suspension of some of the most cherished rights of the individual, even the financial costs of overreaction from a strictly economic perspective seem overwhelming.
Facing an external threat, nations have always behaved in predictable ways. The assassination of the Austrian Arch Duke by a Serbian terrorist plunged the entire world into a catastrophic war just the same way the attacks of 9/11 have created a global crisis, when the US invaded Iraq as a part of a “broader war on terror.” Similarly, responding to the kidnapping of two of its soldiers by Hizbollah, Israel’s war in Lebanon seems to spiral out uncontrollably. The implications of these actions are yet to be fully realized or even understood.
Any action to counter the threat of terrorism carries its own cost. Let us look only at the monetary price of our involvement in Iraq.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the sole superpower quickly decided to invade Afghanistan and Iraq attempting to punish the guilty and protecting the American public from future attacks. In the process the costs of these and other counter-terrorism endeavor have piled up to an unprecedented level. According to the Congressional Research Service, the war effort itself has had a price tag of $409 billion dollars so far. To this astronomical sum, we must add the costs of homeland security undertaken not only by the federal government by also various state governments and even local governments. For instance, New York City, the prime target of the attacks has developed its own security force at cost of millions of dollars.
However, these costs are just the beginning. The heightened sense of insecurity in the US is spilling over on its borders on both sides of the country. Increased restrictions at the borders are costing billions in trade with Mexico and Canada, the biggest trade partner of the US. The fear of illegal immigrants is currently sweeping the country. Many are claiming that a secured border is essential as a safeguard against international terrorism, although there has not been a single reported case in North America or Europe, where illegal immigrants have taken part in terrorist attacks. Yet, this fear is propelling the US to embark on the construction of a wall sealing its border with Mexico. When asked about the price of this monumental project, an influential lawmaker commented, “Whatever it costs.”
If increased poverty and indignation make a volatile mix, our overreaction all over the world can only make us less secured in the long run. Indeed the cost of overreaction is adding up much more than is commonly understood. The possibility of disruption in oil supply is contributing to its rise in price. It is not only impacting those who can least afford it, but by transferring money to the most volatile regions of the world, where much of the oil is produced, it is propping up corrupt dictators, demagogues, and some of the most ardent benefactors of international terrorism.
These costs, however arduous, are not one-time expenditures. As governments attempt to punish the perpetrators they bring death and misery to the population, these, in turn, spawn more acts of terrorism. Thus, Sean MacStiofane, the former Provisional IRA;s Chief of Staff cynically noted: “… most revolutions are not caused by revolutionaries in the first place, but by the stupidity and brutality of governments.” Indeed the cycle of violence produces its own costs, tangible and intangible, for generations to come.
This is not to say that the threats of terrorism to global security are not real. The problem is that facing horrific acts of violence, we often lose our perspective and become eager to assume any cost, any consequence of our impulsive actions.
In a recent speech, Stephen Hawking, one of the most noted physicists of our time warned that the survival of our specie rests with our ability to manage violence in the next 100 years so that humankind can ultimately leave this planet and colonize other worlds. Given human nature and the consequent political, and economic realities, Hawking’s hope does indeed seem like a pie in the sky.

Bakunin Chomsky

2006-05-06T08:43:00.000-07:00

“Bakunin Chomsky”

By assuming a fictitious character Bakunin Chomsky, Professor Jonathan Graubart delivered the following speech at the Fred J. Hansen/ Charles Hostler Lecture Series.

It’s a pleasure to be here: Thanks to Professor Gupta for inviting me to fill in for Prof. Graubart.      Please don’t confuse my views with Graubart’s. For all the FBI and Homeland Security informers in the audience, please just report my name. He is after all, untenured.

I’m Bakunin Chomsky, long-time political activist, freelance professor of law and IR, now based at the Emma Goldman Institute in San Cristobal, Mexico. My parents named me after one of the legendary 19th century Anarchists, Mikhail Bakunin. I’m in town for US-Mex celebrations of the 120th anniversary of the anarchist-led Haymarket demonstrations held in Chicago, May 4, 1886. Haymarket was a wildly successful demonstration of anarchist-led protests to improve daily working condition and social organizing of the workplace. The Haymarket demonstrations have since become the most celebrated event of worker solidarity in the globe, popularly known as May Day.

Interestingly, the one country in the world in which the Haymarket demonstrations of May, 1886 are not well known is the one where the events occurred, the USA. I decided then that my brief comments today on terrorism will touch on two other prominent terrorist events in US history that enjoy very little reflection here. The deeds of the great abolitionist John Brown in the period right before the Civil War and the US State’s dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Let me point out now, to avoid being lynched: I consider the 9/11 plane attacks a clear example of terrorism and one that merits wide condemnation.

My Point today: show a historical pattern whereby our gatekeepers in academia, the media, and governments apply a double standard toward Terrorism. Thus, Terrorism of the Weak that challenges the dominant Order is brutally condemned without any consideration of context while Terrorism of the Powerful is at best ignored and more often Praised.

I. Start with a Generic Def. Of Terrorism: My father Noam likes to refer to one given in 1980s by US Army: Calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature through intimidation, coercion, or instilling of fear.
     Implication: intended audience is not just immediate victims but a far broader one, maybe a whole society.  Ok, reasonable enough.

II. John Brown Example:
A. 19th Century Christian-socialist-feminist Abolitionist who had this crazy view that slavery was a moral obscenity. Concluded that nonviolent protest was not sufficient: slavery remained and slaveholders were well organized in killing and intimidating both slaves who threatened revolt and abolitionists seeking to end slavery through legislation.

B. Two famous deeds:
     1. Goes to “Bleeding Kansas” in 1856 where there is a battle over whether the territory will be a free or slave state. In response to series of lynchings carried out by slaveholder groups in territory, Brown leads a group that hacks to death five slaveholders. Pt: send a message to all slaveholders.

     2. Leads armed raid on US military base, Harpers’ Ferry, Virginia, 1858. Holds a group hostage with hopes of inspiring a mass slave revolt. This failed, Brown was captured and killed by the state.

C. Assessment: clearly terrorist: General view of all “responsible” politicians of time (including most Republicans) was to condemn Brown uncritically and not scrutinize the far more heinous and structural form of terrorism, known as slavery, that Brown and many others resisted.

D. But was Brown wrong? I submit it’s not an easy answer. You might think it accomplished nothing. But the close historical record suggests you are wrong. With the help of influential thinkers, like Henry David Thoreau, Brown’s actions become widely publicized and disseminated. This publicity likely both accelerated the start of the Civil War and pressured moderates in the Republican Party, like Lincoln, to demand the abolition of slavery as a condition for ending the war.
     Worthwhile to point out that although Brown is somewhat well known, he has long been considered a kook despite the overwhelming historical record that his actions were well thought out, occurred in a context of unspeakable atrocities backed by state authority.

II. Event 2: US Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, Aug 6, Aug 9, 1945:
A. Although these bombings are reasonably well known of in US history, there is very little commentary that points out that these are the two most heinous terrorist actions committed in world history. In Japan, the term “Ground Zero” has a very different meaning.

B. You have bombs that by design are meant to kill upward of a hundred thousand civilians. Hard to imagine a more flagrant condemnation of Laws on War Crimes.

C. Think about the Setting: Japan was effectively defeated. Only sticking point was whether surrender would be unconditional or not (meaning let Hirohito stay emperor). Hirohito, in fact, made overtures through Stalin to inform Truman of Japan’s willingness to surrender.

E. Truman and his Sec. Of War, James Byrnes refused the overtures. Why, they wanted to drop the atomic bombs. Why did they want to drop Atomic bombs? Not to hasten Japan’s surrender or save US lives. It was to send a message to USSR to back off in its own imperial ambitions to grab more of Europe and Asia.
     In other words: US govt ordered two consecutive bombs intended to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians to send a broader message of geopolitical intimidation to the USSR.
     Actual toll: 200 thou dead right away, another 100 thou over 5 years.
     After 2 bombings, Japan did surrender. US then allowed Japan to retain its emperor, which had supposedly been unacceptable before.

F. One would like to think such horrendous actions would have been condemned in the US: No, Americans wildly celebrated the “successful” mass terrorist murders of innocents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even now, 61 years later, there has been shockingly little scrutiny of this most heinous action. Indeed, Truman is now worshipped, especially by our so-called opposition political party, the “fighting Dems” who say vote for us because we can wage war more effectively, like Wesley Clark),

III. Big Points About the War on Terror that Go beyond Brown and Hiroshima:
A. There is a Continued Pathological Unwillingness to Scrutinize Terrorist Actions of the Powerful: If anything we hear about how the US needs to be even more brutally terrorist to accomplish its objectives.

B. At the UN, all the so-called antiterrrorist efforts are designed to back the US agenda.
     Thus the UNSC passed a binding resolution that requires all states to institute domestic policies that parallel the Patriot Act-led policies of the US.
     Moreover, the UN Sec Gen’l is pushing for a GA def of terrorism that limits terrorism to that committed by nonstate actors. The idea is then to allow the SC to interpret which actors are deemed terrorist; meaning the US and other great powers effectively decide for us.

C. This is Both Morally Abominable and has the effect of Increasing Both the Terrorism of the Strong and the Terrorism of the Weak.
      US, other powerful states, like Russia and China, and friends of the powerful, like Israel and Turkey, will feel unleashed to engage in state terror for their own “security” concerns.
      Such actions, will in turn increase desperation and misery in areas suffering from State Terror: Meaning they will turn to the retail terror of the weak, like blowing up synagogues, mosques, churches, making lethal weapons out of planes, trains, and buses.

Khaleel Mohammed

2006-05-05T17:59:00.000-07:00

Khaleel Mohammed

Remarks delivered by Professor Khaleel Mohammed on panel entitled “Can we Defeat Terrorism?” at the Hansen Institute for World Peace and Hostler Institute on World Affairs Lecture series at SDSU, on May 4, 2006.

Post 9/11: A Muslim Perspective.

The pervasive Muslim view of the so-called war on terrorism, and the repercussions for Muslims and Islam can be best expressed by the title of Professor Akbar Ahmed’s excellent book “Islam Under Siege.” Let us not misunderstand the meaning of the term: Islam is not only under siege from those without, but also from those within. The war on terrorism, you see, has not only brought about the demonization of the innocent, but has empowered the very entity against which it is supposedly waged.

Islamophobia—a latent centuries-old condition—has now surfaced as a strain of the most virulent potency. For all the declarations of the islamophobes that their war is not against Islam, but against Islamism—the rhetoric of evangelist preachers reveal the truth: Muslims and their religion are to be excised by whatever means possible. Influential preachers like Franklin Graham claim that the God of Islam and the God of Christianity cannot be the same being—and US generals like Boykin buy into that hateful concept. What has escaped that attention of many is that Franklin is simply redirecting Marcion’s medieval Judeophobia, having thus compared the God of Judaism and the God of Christianity.

It is far to demonize Islam without any recourse to proof. A few months ago, KPBS hosted a show about the Darfur genocide and the moderator claimed that it was a war of ‘fundamentalist Islam” against Christians. This blatant untruth—the overwhelming majority of the Darfur victims are Muslim—was presented with the calm conviction of absolute certainty—and the spellbound audience lapped it up almost as divine truth.

After 9/11, certain things have become painfully clear: Muslims have become the target. The imprisonments at Guantanamo, the recent revelations of secret CIA managed prisons in Europe, the calling by one broadcaster for the nuking of Mecca reminds us of a bygone time in which human rights were absent. Last week, a British Muslim student seeking to get a visa to study in the US was told that he had to pay an extra fee for a security check because his name resembled those of terrorists.

There is no point denying the obvious: a sense of fear and doom hangs over the average Muslim. And this very fear is what the Islamists capitalize upon—for every time there is an outrage committed against a Muslim, the Jihadists come closer to their goal of causing Muslims living in the west to feel that there is indeed a war, and that Muslims are the target. What the fear has brought is a circling of the wagons by the extremists on both sides of the fence. Today’s Union Tribune reported that in Sweden, the authorities had rejected a call by a local Muslim leader for special allowances for Islamic law among Muslims. Before 9/11, such a call would have been unthinkable—Muslims were willing to live their lives as citizens of secular countries, leaving Islamic law a subject for Mosque discussions only.

The perception, however, that there is an “us” and “them” has allowed the extremists to ask for the rights for “us” against “them.” The very warped perception forces extremists to want to define themselves against “them” –and so we see a rise of the wearing of the veil, and fundamentalism among Muslims more than ever before.

The US government has sought to eliminate any threat of terrorist activity—as any government ought to do—but has in many cases imprisoned innocents, attempted convictions on the most flimsy grounds—all the while giving actual terrorists a good look at how the system works. Given the way the US legal system operates, the war is not being won in any way, and casuistry and game-playing make a mockery of justice.

A few months ago, in San Diego, I was an expert witness in the Mohammad Abdi case. This Somalian was charged with several offences, among them, that he had not declared himself an employee of the Saudi government. The State’s position was that as an imam and propagator of Islam, he received a salary from the Saudi government. The defense’s argument was that in certain interpretations of Islam, the money paid to the imam is not considered as a salary—and having studied Islamic law, I knew this to be true. The state employed someone who was not familiar with Islamic terminology and used the shallowness of translation to insist that Mr. Abdi was lying. Now it is possible—and I state that simply for argument--that Mr. Abdi may have been lying about other issues of his case, but on the issue of the salary, he was correct. Nonetheless, he was convicted and given double the sentence requested by the state attorneys. He ended up requesting to be deported to Somalia rather than stay in a US jail.

In Lodi California, the opposite scenario happened. Trying to deceive the jury into believing that a very warlike supplication that an accused had on his person was actually a peaceful prayer, the defense sought recourse to what I call “the translation loophole.” What the defense chose not to reveal was that the translation offered was from a sect that is considered heretical in normative Islam, and that the accused would not ever want to be associated with that sect (the Ahmadiyya). The Ahmadiyya sect does not believe in Jihad or any concept of war, and obviously will seek to explain away any classical reference to Jihad.

The almost daily newspaper reports about US connections with torture of Muslim prisoners are letting the nation see that there is a serious double standard regarding Muslims. For an Iraqi “insurgent” to kidnap a civilian is barbaric and terrorist; but for US forces to “detain” a person’s wife or family in order to force him to cooperate is right.
As Mr. Chomsky pointed out in his address to you, the actions of 9/11 were nothing else but the worse form of terrorism. None can deny this. Yet, when Muslims ask if the US bombing of the Sudan medical plant was any different, there is either silence or denial. In fact, many people don’t even know that such a bombing occurred –buttressing the general Muslim view that our blood, our lives don’t count.

On an almost daily basis too we see the stories of the atrocities committed by Muslim extremists—but we hear little of the bombings of entire villages in territories now occupied by US troops. We hear of calls asking for Muslims to speak up and condemn terrorism—as if Muslims do not. We hardly hear of the Lord’s Army, a Christian terrorist group, or of the terrorist activity of any group.
For Muslims in general, there is a sense of frustration, although not of futility. We are frustrated that in the post-shoah world, wherein we supposedly declared “never again” that demonization of Muslims still occurs. We are frustrated at a justice system that has purportedly tried to stamp out terrorist activity, but has succeeded only in costing the taxpayers money, but not in convincing convictions. But we also know that in the beginning, hostile Arabs tried to stamp out Islam, and that after them, there were several others, including the Crusaders and the Mongols. But we are still here. The American people are beginning to see how they have been misled into accepting a nonsensical war. After 9/11, the number of converts to Islam has risen tremendously. The Qur’an states that God made us as several different nations, so that we may find pleasure in taking the time to know and understand each other. Perhaps it is time that we do that rather than rush to hate.

Professor Lei Guang

2006-05-05T16:22:00.000-07:00

Professor Lei Guang

Remarks delivered by Farid Abdel-Nour on panel entitled “Can we Defeat Terrorism?” at the Hansen Institute for World Peace and Hostler Institute on World Affairs Lecture series at SDSU, on May 4, 2006.

East Asian States and the US War on Terrorism

For the United States, 9/11 attack represented an act of ‘war’ that justified a military response. After quickly defeating the Taliban gov’t in Afghanistan, the US military moved on and waged a war in Iraq in 2003 because President Bush believed Saddam Hussein was linked to Al Qaeda and possessed weapons of mass destruction. Neither has turned out to be true, but that has so far not changed this administration’s view on the need for a war on terrorism.

So the war goes on. The US has been mobilizing on all fronts for the war—military, diplomatic, economic, organizational, and linguistic. While some law enforcement efforts continue at home and abroad, these efforts are subordinated to the anti-terrorism war, which involves military campaigns, pre-emptive strikes and unilateral action.

No doubt, the war on terrorism has produced much change in American politics. 9/11 and the war on terrorism has also been heralded as ushering in a new era of international politics, where non-conventional tactics, i.e. pre-emptive wars, have to be employed against non-traditional enemies who are not nation-states, who live a shadowy existence and are irredeemably evil.  It’s the era of secret prisons, wire-tapping of citizens and propaganda machines.

So if we live in this country, see things happening around us, and hear the rhetoric that comes out of Washington, we probably believe that indeed the world has entered a new era, that anti-terrorism is now the order of the day, and that it’s going to last a long, long time until we unilaterally declare total victory, a second coming of “mission accomplished.”

But, when we go outside of the US, things appear quite different. As Peter Katzenstein has pointed out “Although 9/11 significantly changed the US, the terrorist attacks did not change much of the world at large. The US sense of urgency to engage in what it regards a war of good against evil has not been widely shared abroad”

We have read a lot about the very public dispute between some of the European countries and the US regarding the war in Iraq, the nature of terrorism and the tactics that should be deployed in the fight against terrorism.  Here, I would like to comment on the responses by the governments in East Asia (primarily Japan, China, and the two Koreas).

I want to make two broad points: (1) one is that 9/11 has not fundamentally changed the way East Asian countries behave toward each other and in international politics…there is far more continuity between what they were up to before and after 9/11; (2) second point, the US war on terrorism has afforded new opportunities for these countries to pursue the same objectives they had before the crisis.

My talk today gives an overview of how East Asian states have responded to the “dangers” and “opportunities” presented by the US war on terrorism. To sum it all up, 9/11 and the US war on terrorism has not led to any fundamental changes in the behaviors of the East Asian states.  If anything, the war on terror has afforded new opportunities, For Japan, it’s the opportunity to break out of the straightjacket of its peace constitution; for China, it’s an opportunity to securing the US support for its domestic agenda and against Taiwan independence; For South Korea, it’s an opportunity to press ahead with North-South reconciliation. For North Korea, it’s time to take advantage of a distracted US to forge ahead with its nuclear programs to ensure the survival of the regime.

Farid AbdelNour

2006-05-05T16:18:00.000-07:00

Farid Abdel-Nour

Remarks delivered by Farid Abdel-Nour on panel entitled “Can we Defeat Terrorism?” at the Hansen Institute for World Peace and Hostler Institute on World Affairs Lecture series at SDSU, on May 4, 2006.

The Moral Uselessness of Terrorism

In my remarks I will focus on how we use the term terrorism and why it is so difficult to define.  I argue that the very term serves a function of moral obfuscation.

Defining terrorism would not be so difficult if when we used it we meant to describe a particular method of using violence.  If when we used the term we meant something analogous to what we mean when we use terms like “war” or “killing” there would not be such controversy surrounding its definition.  When we say “war” we try to capture with that word a political phenomenon, just as when we say killing we try to capture a social phenomenon.  In both of these cases we leave open the question of whether we approve of the war in question or whether we approve of the specific act of killing.  We can qualify the term war by saying “this is a just war” or “this is an unjust war”.  Similarly we can qualify the term “killing” by saying “this is a justifiable act of killing” (in self defense for example), or we can say “this is not a justifiable act of killing” in which case it might constitute murder.  We understand war and killing as phenomena in the world about which, depending on circumstances we can make different types of moral judgment.

This is not the case with the way we use the term “terrorism.”  We do not use the term to denote a phenomenon about any particular instance of which we can ponder if it is just or unjust.  We use the term terrorism in a way that already includes a final value judgment.  This complicates the question of defining it.  It means that in our political discourse we do not use the term terrorism in a way that is analogous to the way we use war or killing.  We use it instead in a way that is analogous to our use of the term “evil.”  In other words, when we label an act or a person as terrorist we do something analogous to what we do when we label someone or something as evil.

The term evil is not so much used to capture and denote a clearly identifiable political or social phenomenon. Rather, it is used to denote something about the relationship between the person who is using the term and the one who is being labeled by it.

The terms “terrorist” and “evil” have one very important feature in common.  They are never used to describe self.  They always describe an Other.   People might say “I am a sinner,” “I am a criminal,” “I am a murderer,” “I have broken the law,” “I have made a mistake,” but no one says “I am evil.”  However it flows relatively easily off our tongues to say “you are evil” or “he or she is evil.”  The same applies to terrorism.  Anytime anyone is accused of terrorism they respond with “I am not the terrorist, they are the real terrorists” (usually pointing to ones identified with his accusers).

No on says about him or herself “I am a terrorist” or about his or her group “we are terrorists.”  This tells us something about how this term functions in our political discourse and why it is not only difficult, but should prove to be impossible to define in any way that would have universal credibility.

Since the term terrorism always denotes actions that self would never perform, it serves to help define who “we are not” and how “we” are distinct from others (no matter who the “we” is).  The reason that a universal definition of terrorism is difficult is that each group will want the definition to exclude the types of actions that they themselves engage in or would like to feel entitled to engage in.  They would each like the definition of terrorism to include actions that others against whom they define themselves engage in.

Let us consider a couple of potential definitions of terrorism that capture the value judgment that is always wrapped into the term and hidden inside it, and see how these attempted definitions would be hard for us to accept because they do not allow for a moral gulf to separate “us “ from “the terrorists.”

We can begin with a definition I heard in this room during this lecture series that went something like this:  “we follow the rules of war—the terrorists do not.  This is what distinguishes us from the terrorists.”  At the time when I heard this definition, I was very offended because the speaker, who was a guest in our country, was insulting us all by implying that the U.S. is a terrorist state.  He must have been aware of the Guantanamo Bay detention center and the violations of the rules of war that are involved.  He must have also been aware of the violations of the rules of war in the Abu Ghreib prison.  Nonetheless he had the audacity to suggest that by violating the rules of war (something we do on a regular basis) we would be grouped as terrorists.

Such an attempt at a definition cannot be accurate because it does not serve to show how we are not terrorists.  So we should try to work with a more “refined” definition.

Perhaps, as innumerable public figures keep repeating ad nauseam, the difference between the terrorists and us is that “we do not target civilians, whereas the terrorists do.”   This attempt at a definition requires some careful interpreting.

First, it cannot mean that the terrorists kill civilians whereas we do not, because of course we kill civilians all the time and we kill them in large numbers.  Consider for example that during the first forty-two days of the Iraq war, U.S. and coalition forces killed 7312 civilians, more than double the number of civilians killed on September 11th.

Anyone who tries to define terrorism as the killing of civilians is someone with bad intentions towards us.  Such a person would be trying to label us as terrorists.

This means that we must refine our interpretation of the targeting civilians definition.  We might instead interpret it as follows: the difference between the terrorists and us is that we kill civilians only by mistake, that is unintentionally, while terrorists kill civilians intentionally.  I am afraid that someone who offers such an interpretation must also have bad intentions towards us. Because of course we kill civilians intentionally all the time.  For example, when our troops identify a city such as Fallujah for attack, they know and we know that cities include civilians (including women and children).  The attack on Fallujah in April 2004 yielded 300 children and women dead (aside from any civilian men).  It was no secret that Fallujah contained civilians, it was bombed to the ground nonetheless, intentionally killing civilians.  When our troops assassinated an al-Qaeda operative in Afghanistan several weeks ago they took a number of civilians with him, intentionally, knowingly.  He was in a private home where civilians tend to live.

This means that terrorism cannot involve simply killing civilians intentionally.  That cannot be the way to define terrorism.  We must try to refine our interpretation of targeting civilians even further.  Perhaps by saying that we do not target civilians we mean that we only intentionally kill civilians when we suspect them of being in bad company, whereas terrorists intentionally kill civilians even when they do not suspect them of being in bad company.

I think one could go on—what does it mean to be in bad company, to suspect someone of being in bad company?  What does it mean to try to assassinate people we have vague suspicions about?  But there is no need to go on.  You get the point.

At best, the difference between the people we label as terrorist and us is a moral hair-split.  At worst, any distinction in the types of behavior we engage in and that they engage in is unsustainable.  Either way, we see that the term “terrorist” does not help us distinguish between different types of behavior in any morally significant sense.  Its main function seems to be to convince us that there are evil others who are unlike us in every respect, against whom we can define ourselves, and at whom we can look with self-righteous indignation.

The term terrorism serves to obfuscate the fact that the difference between those we label as terrorists and ourselves is not a moral gulf at all, but at best a moral hair, or perhaps there is no moral difference at all.

A Theory of Suicide

2006-05-02T22:52:00.000-07:00

A Theory of Suicide Bombing

Notes on Mia Bloom’s chapter four. Five, and six.

Suicide attacks are unique in that with every attack the ranks of the true believers get depleted.  However, if it plays right to the intended audience, every suicide attack creates more willing volunteers.

Domestic politics is an important determinant of suicide attacks.  If the base accepts such attacks, the group that can deliver it, gains increase in political support.

Individual motivation

The volunteers in suicide attack are often driven by a sense of humiliation or deep injustice.

Religion may play an important role in prompting people to become a shahid (martyr), but it si not always necessary.  For instance, the LTTE is not a religious organization.  Also, PFLP (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine) is a Marxist organization.

Organization

Regardless of the individual motivations, it is the organization that decides when and how suicide attacks will take place.  There is a great deal of planning and logistical support that are needed for such attacks.  Thus, these attacks follow the strategic needs of the organizations.  These strategic considerations include a) retaliation against the enemy; b) vying for market share of popular support; and c) support of the state sponsor (if any) or the Diaspora.

Therefore, following these three factors, when the enemy (the state of Israel for Hamas, the PIJ, and other Palestinian groups, the Turkish government for the PKK, the Russian government for the Chechens, and the Sri Lankan government for the LTTE) over reacts and metes out community punishments, it only helps the suicide attackers.  When the popular base, or an external friendly state or the Diaspora supports them, these organizations become stronger.

On the other hand, suicide attacks stop when such actions reduce the popular support for the organization or, if a charismatic leader is eliminated.  Thus the PKK (Turkish Workers Party) lost its support base when in started a suicide attack campaign.  Also, the arrest of their leader Abdullah Ocalan caused them at abadon such attacks.

Hizballah gave up suicide attacks after it became part of the legitimate political process in Lebanon.

Robert Pape claims that suicide attacks are particularly successful against democracies.  However, it is not clear how he defines democracy, since Isreal, India, Sri Lanka, US, Great Britain, and Spain may be considered as democracies, Russia and Turkey seem to have lesser claim to democratic principles.  Countries like Pakistan, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia cannot be regarded as democratic.

Kourosh Mobiniasked

2006-04-29T15:43:00.000-07:00

Kourosh Mobini asked me about Lech Valesa’s comment about religion. From my perspective, religion is nothing more than an instrument for forming collective identities. Therefore, it really does not matter if people agree that there is but one God. Look at the conflicts between the Shi’as and Sunnis, and between Catholics and Protestants. They have lasted nearly 1500 years. Therefore, I find his comment to be overly optimistic. It would be nice if our conflicts within and between religious faiths were confined to theological discussions. Unfortunately, religion often follow the contours of other explosive faultiness, such as income inequality, social and political marginalization. When that happens, religion becomes an instrument of forming political identity in the hands of some political entrepreneurs.

What I was going to ask Mr. Valesa was the following: Lech Valesa credits the Pope (John Paul) 50% for the fall of the Soviet Union; his own movement, 30%. Presumably, according to him, the bumbling Gorbachev also has a good deal to do with the regime’s final demise. In contrast, in this country, we – and particularly the Republican Party – attribute the credit to President Ronald Reagan’s policies for the destruction of the Soviet Empire. From Mr. Valesa’s perspective, how did he view Mr. Reagan’s arms buildup and his call to “tear down the wall”?

Uniting Nations Agai

2006-04-16T21:57:00.000-07:00

Uniting Nations Against Terrorism

The United Nations has a comparative advantage over other organizations and countries trying to thwart terrorism, according to Alex P. Schmid, the officer in charge of the United Nations Terrorism Prevention Branch in Vienna, Austria. Schmid headlined the ninth installment of a semester-long lecture series about terrorism, held April 6 in the Hardy Tower auditorium.
Schmid said there are four areas where the United Nations has a comparative advantage over other organizations when it comes to fighting terrorism.
"The United Nations can set the ground rules for international behavior and it can enhance international coordination and cooperation," Schmid said. "The U.N. can also build up the capacity of less developed countries through technical assistance programs. Capacity-building, however, must take place in a framework of the rule of law — otherwise it contributes to strengthening state repression which in turn can foster further acts of terrorism."
Schmid said terrorism is one of half a dozen growing threats to international security in the decades ahead, next to nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, transnational crime, internal conflict, inter-state conflict, economic and social threats, and environmental degradation.
Schmid outlined the United Nations' strategy against international terrorism, which United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented in March 2005:
● Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals;

● Deny terrorists the means to carry out their attacks;

● Deter states from supporting terrorists;

● Develop state capacity to prevent terrorism;

● Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.
Schmid said that a variety of United Nations offices, departments and programs are involved in promoting international measures against terrorism.
Schmid said the General Assembly and its committee on terrorism have focused efforts to find a criminal law definition of terrorism. He said the criminal law definition of terrorism can be narrower than a social science definition, which might contain the following elements:
● The demonstrative use of violence against human beings;

● The (conditional) threat of more violence;

● The deliberate production of terror/fear in a target group;

● The predominant targeting of civilians, non-combatants and third parties;

● The purpose of intimidation, coercion and/or propaganda;

● The fact that it is a method, tactic or strategy of conflict waging;

● The importance of communicating the acts of violence to larger audiences;

● The illegal, criminal and immoral nature of the acts of violence;
● The predominantly political character of the act;
● Its use as a tool of psychological warfare to mobilize or immobilize sectors of the public.
"At the heart of the U.N. debate on terrorism are underlying issues of defining power, just war theory and double standards," Schmid said. "There is some hope that in 2006 the long-awaited Comprehensive Convention Against International Terrorism, which includes a definition of terrorism, will be presented to the General Assembly."
He said the Security Council's activities in the field focus on the imposition of sanctions and binding counter-terrorism obligations on all member states.
"In the course of April 2006, the Secretary-General is likely to propose a broader strategy," Schmid said.
While the content of the broader strategy is not yet known, Schmid said there are four elements he feels should be included:
● Counter the ideologies, propaganda and indoctrination of secular and non-secular terrorists and try to get the upper hand in the war of ideas — the battle for the hearts and minds of those the terrorists claim to speak and fight for;

● Prevent radical individuals and groups from becoming extremists by confronting them with a mix of tactics and search for effective counter-motivation measures;

● Address the underlying conflict issues exploited by terrorists and work towards peaceful solutions while not making any substantive concessions to the terrorists themselves;

● Maintain the moral high-ground in the struggle with terrorists by defending and strengthening good governance, rule of law, democracy and social justice.

Lecture Notes 4-4-06

2006-04-04T22:50:00.000-07:00

Lecture Notes, 4-4-06

The next three articles in our reading list concentrate on suicide bombing. The desire to kill oneself in order to kill others for political or religious purposes assault our notion of rationality like nothing else. Therefore, it is no surprise that there are many theories about who they are what motivates them. Yet, this seemingly inexplicable event has spread all over the world, increasing at an alarming rate in the past ten years.

Ariel Merari defines suicide attacks as (p. 71) “… is a situation in which a person intentionally kills himself (or herself) for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal.” By this definition, volunteers in a risky military operation (e.g., Saving Private Ryan) do not qualify, since, despite the high risk, their deaths were not certain. On the other hand, the Kamikaze pilots in the WWII, would be considered as suicide attackers.

Although many people think of those who take part in suicide attacks as “brainwashed”, desperate, or religious fanatics, empirical data show a much more complex picture. Very few, if any are crazy or have psychological disorder, most groups are not inspired by religious fanaticism.

While we theorize about the motivations of the suicide bombers, the Palestinian authors see them as reaction to Israeli occupation and the associated humiliation and brutality that the community faces on a daily basis.

2006-04-01T23:18:00.000-08:00

Andy’s comment is well taken. In political persuasion, the need is to find a phrase that conveys a clear picture with the simplest of terms. That is why “war on terror” became so popular with the Administration. However, my (and Martha Crenshaw’s and most other terrorism experts’) objection is to the term, war. War gives the impression of a defined enemy and a final outcome of absolute victory. In the absence of these two essential elements, we may try to find another term which is less “inspiring” but is far more accurate of the situation at hand. For me, “battle against terrorism” or “struggle with the terrorists” are, perhaps, closer to the reality. What do you think?

Kristen has a very g

2006-03-30T09:31:00.000-08:00

Kristen has a very good point. Our policies are determined by what we call something. Sometime language can, therefore, be an obstacle to our understanding of a problem. As you know, there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. It is certainly a term that will evoke strong sentiments on all sides of the issue.

Lecture notes 3-29-06

2006-03-29T08:23:00.000-08:00

Lecture notes: 3-29-06

Do terrorists come from poor background?  Or are they bunch of losers?

Despite common perception, Jitka Maleckova finds that that is not the case.  In 1978, Russell and Miller by studying 350 individuals active in groups from Latin America, Europe, Japan found that 2/3rds came from middle to upper middle class background.

A 1999CIA [Hudson, 1999] funded study agreed with the general findings of Russell and Miller.  However, they found that while the participants from the developed countries were from affluent families, in the developing countries, such as in Latin America, they came from poorer background.

Krueger and Maleckova (2002; 2003), Sageman (2003) challenge this developed/underdeveloped dichotomy.  But Sageman found that while the people from Arab countries were better educated and middle class, the Magreb Arabs were not.  Similar studies (Hurvitz, 1998) of Hizballah, and Berrebi (2003) of Hamas and the PIJ were not from the impoverished class of Lebanese and Palestinian population, respectively.Therefore, poverty serves only as a week link to terrorism.

How about gender differences?  Although Arab/Muslim groups for a long time did not accept women in the direct involvement in guerrilla actions, the Chechnians and the Tamils relied heavily on women.

The sight of the 9/11 attacks caused many to wonder how any rational person can do such a thing.  Many theories of motivation were offered.  Some thought that these people were brainwashed, some thought that they were acting on their personal revenge, while others theorized that it was blind religious fanaticism that serves as the root cause of suicide terrorism. Yet, as Arield Merari points out, none of them hold true when we consider the empirical evidence gathered from groups across the world.

What about the countries?  Do poor countries produce more terrorists?  There is absolutely no correlation between per capita GDP and incidents of terrorism.

What about popular support for terrorism.  Mia Bloom (2005) and others have found a strong correlation between public support for terrorism and their occurrence.

Jerrold Post finds the forces of socialization as the strongest motivating force for terrorism.  Palestinian kids from the Gaza Strip, the Catholics in Northern Ireland learn hatred from their birth.  Jerrold Post suggests that the fusion between individual identity and group identity cause acts of terrorism.  Thus, to the al-Qaeda members, a suicide attack is not “suicide.”  It is ishtihad, or an act of ultimate self-sacrifice for the cause of the group.

Looking at terrorism from a social psychological perspective, there is nothing terribly mysterious about terrorism.  The conclusion that we can draw is that there is no single profile for the terrorists.  Nor does it have a single “root cause.”  Thus, for many of us, the real mystery is the lack of mystery.

War On Terrorism Are

2006-03-27T15:54:00.000-08:00

War On Terrorism: Are We Winning?
Lecture by Martha Crenshaw
The war on terrorism is unlike any other military conflict in United States history and, perhaps, impossible to win, according to Martha Crenshaw.
Crenshaw, professor of government at Weselyan University, headlined the seventh installment of a semester-long lecture series about terrorism. Her presentation to more than 250 in attendance at the March 23 event in the Hardy Tower auditorium was titled, "The War on Terrorism: Are We Winning?"
Crenshaw outlining the objectives of her presntation: discuss why a public debate on the war on terrorism is essential; explain what a counter-terrorist strategy is; define the United States strategy; and determine how the war should be evaluated.
Crenshaw said President Bush and members of his administration – particularly Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld – are unwilling to critically evaluate the risks of their policies or military strategies. She said it is apparent that they will not consider correcting or altering their plans, no matter how much evidence suggests those plans aren’t working.
Crenshaw said a counter-terrorism strategy should have a detailed plan to reach clearly-defined goals. She said the strategy can’t be too ambitious or grand. It also should not have ambiguous ends. She said the strategy should include cost and benefit projections, which would make it possible to properly calculate results.
Crenshaw evaluated the United States’ anti-terrorism strategy, starting with President Bush’s remarks following the tragic events Sept. 11, 2001 and how he immediately framed the response as a "war of terrorism."
According to Crenshaw, the current counter-terrorist strategy of military pre-emption is highly ambiguous and completely at odds with what Crenshaw stated a proper strategy should be.
She said United States policy can be defined by four tenets known as the "Four Ds:" defeat terrorism by force; deny terrorists the luxury of state sponsorships, and safe havens; diminish root causes for the support of terrorism; and defend the American homeland and American interests abroad against terrorist attacks.
Crenshaw evaluated the results for each tenet. Although many top terrorist leaders and their followers have been killed, captured or on the run, according to Crenshaw, terrorist groups are continuing to recruit new members at a record pace.
Crenshaw said is too early to know if the strategy to deny terrorists state sponsorship is successful or not. She said diminishing the support for terrorism has also proved problematic. She said relief efforts following the tsunamis in South-East Asia and the earthquakes in Pakistan have done little to change the negative perception of the United States among groups that are producing terrorists.

Let me talk about an

2006-03-11T21:19:00.000-08:00

Let me talk about another important matter. Some of you may have seen that two of Hinduism’s holiest shrines in Varanasi, India were bombed (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4792072.stm). Although no group has claimed responsibilities, suspicion has fallen on the Islamic extremists, particularly on the Kashmiri separatist groups. Assuming that is the case, what do you think was the motivation(s) behind this attack, which had no military significance whatsoever? Any thoughts?

2006-03-06T11:30:00.000-08:00

My primary premise is that people are motivated not only by their self-interest but also by the perceived welfare of the group in which they belong. The notion of what is best for the group and what individual member must do are defined and articulated by the group leaders. Once a group leader identifies for the members who are the members and who the enemies are, it becomes a matter of process to channel the collective frustration and anger toward a specific target. We can understand genocides, civil wars and terrorism within this broad framework.

2006-03-06T10:31:00.000-08:00

Published in 2001.