The world is often guilty of ignoring Africa. There are many local or regional conflicts which have the potential of threatening all of us. Marc Linville suggests that we look at the following article on Uganda. Let us know what you thik. http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070302/ap_on_go_ot/us_uganda

Why Do Hawks Win the Debate?

I found this very interesting article by Nobel Laureate economist Daniel Kahneman. See what you think of this.


Why Hawks Win
By Daniel Kahneman, Jonathan Renshon
Page 1 of 1

January/February 2007

Why are hawks so influential? The answer may lie deep in the human mind. People have dozens of decision-making biases, and almost all favor conflict rather than concession. A look at why the tough guys win more than they should.


Elizabeth Glassanos/FOREIGN POLICY
Should Hawks Win? Matthew Continetti of the conservative Weekly Standard and Matthew Yglesias of the liberal American Prospect square off in an FP web exclusive debate. Kahneman and Renshon respond to the debate here.
National leaders get all sorts of advice in times of tension and conflict. But often the competing counsel can be broken down into two basic categories. On one side are the hawks: They tend to favor coercive action, are more willing to use military force, and are more likely to doubt the value of offering concessions. When they look at adversaries overseas, they often see unremittingly hostile regimes who only understand the language of force. On the other side are the doves, skeptical about the usefulness of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions. Where hawks see little in their adversaries but hostility, doves often point to subtle openings for dialogue.

As the hawks and doves thrust and parry, one hopes that the decision makers will hear their arguments on the merits and weigh them judiciously before choosing a course of action. Don’t count on it. Modern psychology suggests that policymakers come to the debate predisposed to believe their hawkish advisors more than the doves. There are numerous reasons for the burden of persuasion that doves carry, and some of them have nothing to do with politics or strategy. In fact, a bias in favor of hawkish beliefs and preferences is built into the fabric of the human mind.

Social and cognitive psychologists have identified a number of predictable errors (psychologists call them biases) in the ways that humans judge situations and evaluate risks. Biases have been documented both in the laboratory and in the real world, mostly in situations that have no connection to international politics. For example, people are prone to exaggerating their strengths: About 80 percent of us believe that our driving skills are better than average. In situations of potential conflict, the same optimistic bias makes politicians and generals receptive to advisors who offer highly favorable estimates of the outcomes of war. Such a predisposition, often shared by leaders on both sides of a conflict, is likely to produce a disaster. And this is not an isolated example.

In fact, when we constructed a list of the biases uncovered in 40 years of psychological research, we were startled by what we found: All the biases in our list favor hawks. These psychological impulses—only a few of which we discuss here—incline national leaders to exaggerate the evil intentions of adversaries, to misjudge how adversaries perceive them, to be overly sanguine when hostilities start, and overly reluctant to make necessary concessions in negotiations. In short, these biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.

None of this means that hawks are always wrong. One need only recall the debates between British hawks and doves before World War II to remember that doves can easily find themselves on the wrong side of history. More generally, there are some strong arguments for deliberately instituting a hawkish bias. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to demand far more than a 50-50 chance of being right before we accept the promises of a dangerous adversary. The biases that we have examined, however, operate over and beyond such rules of prudence and are not the product of thoughtful consideration. Our conclusion is not that hawkish advisors are necessarily wrong, only that they are likely to be more persuasive than they deserve to be.

VISION PROBLEMS

Several well-known laboratory demonstrations have examined the way people assess their adversary’s intelligence, willingness to negotiate, and hostility, as well as the way they view their own position. The results are sobering. Even when people are aware of the context and possible constraints on another party’s behavior, they often do not factor it in when assessing the other side’s motives. Yet, people still assume that outside observers grasp the constraints on their own behavior. With armies on high alert, it’s an instinct that leaders can ill afford to ignore.

Imagine, for example, that you have been placed in a room and asked to watch a series of student speeches on the policies of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez. You’ve been told in advance that the students were assigned the task of either attacking or supporting Chávez and had no choice in the matter. Now, suppose that you are then asked to assess the political leanings of these students. Shrewd observers, of course, would factor in the context and adjust their assessments accordingly. A student who gave an enthusiastic pro-Chávez speech was merely doing what she was told, not revealing anything about her true attitudes. In fact, many experiments suggest that people would overwhelmingly rate the pro-Chávez speakers as more leftist. Even when alerted to context that should affect their judgment, people tend to ignore it. Instead, they attribute the behavior they see to the person’s nature, character, or persistent motives. This bias is so robust and common that social psychologists have given it a lofty title: They call it the fundamental attribution error.

The effect of this failure in conflict situations can be pernicious. A policymaker or diplomat involved in a tense exchange with a foreign government is likely to observe a great deal of hostile behavior by that country’s representatives. Some of that behavior may indeed be the result of deep hostility. But some of it is simply a response to the current situation as it is perceived by the other side. What is ironic is that individuals who attribute others’ behavior to deep hostility are quite likely to explain away their own behavior as a result of being “pushed into a corner” by an adversary. The tendency of both sides of a dispute to view themselves as reacting to the other’s provocative behavior is a familiar feature of marital quarrels, and it is found as well in international conflicts. During the run-up to World War I, the leaders of every one of the nations that would soon be at war perceived themselves as significantly less hostile than their adversaries.

If people are often poorly equipped to explain the behavior of their adversaries, they are also bad at understanding how they appear to others. This bias can manifest itself at critical stages in international crises, when signals are rarely as clear as diplomats and generals believe them to be. Consider the Korean War, just one example of how misperception and a failure to appreciate an adversary’s assessment of intentions can lead to hawkish outcomes. In October 1950, as coalition forces were moving rapidly up the Korean Peninsula, policymakers in Washington were debating how far to advance and attempting to predict China’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson was convinced that “no possible shred of evidence could have existed in the minds of the Chinese Communists about the non-threatening intentions of the forces of the United Nations.” Because U.S. leaders knew that their intentions toward China were not hostile, they assumed that the Chinese knew this as well. Washington was, therefore, incapable of interpreting the Chinese intervention as a reaction to a threat. Instead, the Americans interpreted the Chinese reaction as an expression of fundamental hostility toward the United States. Some historians now believe that Chinese leaders may in fact have seen advancing Allied forces as a threat to their regime.

CARELESSLY OPTIMISTIC

Excessive optimism is one of the most significant biases that psychologists have identified. Psychological research has shown that a large majority of people believe themselves to be smarter, more attractive, and more talented than average, and they commonly overestimate their future success. People are also prone to an “illusion of control”: They consistently exaggerate the amount of control they have over outcomes that are important to them—even when the outcomes are in fact random or determined by other forces. It is not difficult to see that this error may have led American policymakers astray as they laid the groundwork for the ongoing war in Iraq.

Indeed, the optimistic bias and the illusion of control are particularly rampant in the run-up to conflict. A hawk’s preference for military action over diplomatic measures is often built upon the assumption that victory will come easily and swiftly. Predictions that the Iraq war would be a “cakewalk,” offered up by some supporters of that conflict, are just the latest in a long string of bad hawkish predictions. After all, Washington elites treated the first major battle of the Civil War as a social outing, so sure were they that federal troops would rout rebel forces. General Noel de Castelnau, chief of staff for the French Army at the outset of World War I, declared, “Give me 700,000 men and I will conquer Europe.” In fact, almost every decision maker involved in what would become the most destructive war in history up to that point predicted not only victory for his side, but a relatively quick and easy victory. These delusions and exaggerations cannot be explained away as a product of incomplete or incorrect information. Optimistic generals will be found, usually on both sides, before the beginning of every military conflict.

If optimism is the order of the day when it comes to assessing one’s own chances in armed conflict, however, gloom usually prevails when evaluating another side’s concessions. Psychologically, we are receptive not only to hawks’ arguments for war but also to their case against negotiated solutions. The intuition that something is worth less simply because the other side has offered it is referred to in academic circles as “reactive devaluation.” The very fact that a concession is offered by somebody perceived as hostile undermines the content of the proposal. What was said matters less than who said it. And so, for example, American policymakers would likely look very skeptically on any concessions made by the regime in Tehran. Some of that skepticism could be the rational product of past experience, but some of it may also result from unconscious—and not necessarily rational—devaluation.

Evidence suggests that this bias is a significant stumbling block in negotiations between adversaries. In one experiment, Israeli Jews evaluated an actual Israeli-authored peace plan less favorably when it was attributed to the Palestinians than when it was attributed to their own government. Pro-Israel Americans saw a hypothetical peace proposal as biased in favor of Palestinians when authorship was attributed to Palestinians, but as “evenhanded” when they were told it was authored by Israelis.

DOUBLE OR NOTHING

It is apparent that hawks often have the upper hand as decision makers wrestle with questions of war and peace. And those advantages do not disappear as soon as the first bullets have flown. As the strategic calculus shifts to territory won or lost and casualties suffered, a new idiosyncrasy in human decision making appears: our deep-seated aversion to cutting our losses. Imagine, for example, the choice between:

Option A: A sure loss of $890

Option B: A 90 percent chance to lose $1,000 and a 10 percent chance to lose nothing.

In this situation, a large majority of decision makers will prefer the gamble in Option B, even though the other choice is statistically superior. People prefer to avoid a certain loss in favor of a potential loss, even if they risk losing significantly more. When things are going badly in a conflict, the aversion to cutting one’s losses, often compounded by wishful thinking, is likely to dominate the calculus of the losing side. This brew of psychological factors tends to cause conflicts to endure long beyond the point where a reasonable observer would see the outcome as a near certainty. Many other factors pull in the same direction, notably the fact that for the leaders who have led their nation to the brink of defeat, the consequences of giving up will usually not be worse if the conflict is prolonged, even if they are worse for the citizens they lead.

U.S. policymakers faced this dilemma at many points in Vietnam and today in Iraq. To withdraw now is to accept a sure loss, and that option is deeply unattractive. The option of hanging on will therefore be relatively attractive, even if the chances of success are small and the cost of delaying failure is high.

Hawks, of course, can cite many moments in recent history when adversaries actually were unremittingly hostile and when force produced the desired result or should have been applied much earlier. The clear evidence of a psychological bias in favor of aggressive outcomes cannot decide the perennial debates between the hawks and the doves. It won’t point the international community in a clear direction on Iran or North Korea. But understanding the biases that most of us harbor can at least help ensure that the hawks don’t win more arguments than they should.

Daniel Kahneman is a Nobel laureate in economics and Eugene Higgins professor of psychology and professor of public affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Jonathan Renshon is a doctoral student in the Department of Government at Harvard University and author of Why Leaders Choose War: The Psychology of Prevention (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006).

Male Warrior Factor

Male Warrior Factor

Someone in class asked me about the effects of groups on male behavior.  I just read an article.  Please look up: http://www.cnn.com/2006/TECH/science/09/09/warrior.effect.reut/index.html.

These findings are consistent with other research in various branches of social sciences and social psychology.  Men seem to be genetically more prone toward responding with force when faced with any kind of threat.  Therefore, men tend to be more militaristic, chauvinistic, and macho patriotic.  

AndyS commented on m

AndyS commented on my lecture note and provided an interesting observation based on a perverted logic.  He asks, why the American government doesn’t say what it really means: “acts of ‘terrorism' are actions that seek to terrorize U.S civilians?”  He says that may be we should not seek a global definition.  What are your thoughts?

Lecture Notes 82906

Lecture Notes (8/29/06)

Defining “terrorism” is problematic.  This is because the term has a strong pejorative connotation.  No group today claims to be “terrorist.”  Yet, until about 1940s, many groups would welcome this epithet as a badge of honor.  

Alex Schmid studied over 100 different definitions of terrorism given by national governments, intelligence specialists and academics.  He found that most of these emphasize the i) use of force against non-combatants, ii) having a political goal, and iii) aiming at creating an atmosphere of fear among civilian population.  We may also add to it, iv) non-governmental agent (a group, as opposed to a state).

Why is it difficult to define terrorism?  It is basically a political term used to describe activities that “we” don’t like.  If we liked it, we would not have called it so.  Take for instance, use of force.  All organized countries use military against their adversaries in warfare.  On the process many innocent civilians die.  Is that terrorism?  

Or, consider the attack on the USS Cole.  Since it did not involve civilian population, was it a terrorist attack?

Having a political goal is important.  This distinguishes a “terrorist” action from a criminal act.  While the former carries political goals, the latter only the motivation of making money.

What happens when a civilian target is chosen by a government to instill fear?  For instance, should we call the firebombing of Desden during the WWII or the dropping of the atomic bombs on civilian population acts of terrorism?  

Finally, if we only call actions taken by a non-government group as “terrorism,” what about our support for the Contras in Nicaragua or the Mujahideens fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan?  What about the downing of the Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland by the agents of the Libyan government?

However, it is important to define terrorism, if we are to call it “illegal” and wish to fight it.  Unfortunately, as of now, the United Nations has failed to come up with a definition, which would satisfy all the governments, including our own.  At the end, “terrorism” like beauty is in the eyes of the beholder.

Questions from Parvda

I was asked the following questions by a reporter of Pravda, a Slovak newspaper.  I thought I would share it with you.  Please post your comments.

What are the most visible changes in al-Qaeda organization from 9/11 till
today?

The most visible change is in the personnel of its old organizational structure.  Most of the top echelon is either dead or captured.  As a result, there are new faces.  Unfortunately, not much is known about the current organizational hierarchy.  Judging for the steady stream of media releases of bin Landen and al Zawahiri tapes, it seems that the infrastructure pipeline is still intact.  

Why we are still no able to catch Osama bin Laden?  

It is not unusual for a fugitive to evade arrest for a very long time, when a large segment of the population and the government apparatus protect him.  For instance, the NATO forces have not been able to capture Radco Mladich and Radovan Karadich from the heart of Europe.  How can we the expect to capture OBL from a very protective custody of the Poshtun population?  Also, I strongly suspect that within the Pakistani administration there are two groups.  The first one is happy to look the other way and seriously hope that OBL not be caught within the Pakistani territory for the following reasons:

1. Given his stature among the common people, no ruler of a Muslim country can be seen as a party to OBL’s capture.  In that happens, the first casualty will be Parvez Musharaff himself.


2. Judging from past history, there is every reason to believe that the US has no long-term interest in Pakistan.  As long as the threat of an enemy looms large and Pakistan is seen as a useful ally, the US will be interested in the country.  

Then there is another faction within Pakistan, perhaps headed by their intelligence agency, the ISI, which is actively supporting OBL for ideological reasons.

Therefore, given the popularity of OBL and complicity of the Pakistani government, it is not at all surprising that he has not been caught yet.

How significant is his role in al-Qaeda organization in present time? Is he now only a symbol?

He is still a very large symbol of Islamic resistance against the West.  To test it, all you have to do is to go to most Islamic countries and see whose pictures the street vendors are selling.

I know it is very hard to say but what could be the most imminent terrorist
threat?

Nobody knows.  However, it seems that attacks on mass transit systems still dominate their imagination.

Do you think finding real solution of israeli-palestinian conflict could have some real impact on militant Islamist groups like al-Qaeda?

NO.  There are several reasons for that.

1. There is no unanimity among the Islamist militants when it comes to the nature of a “real solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian problem.  Is it a two-state solution or the total destruction of the Jewish state?  


2. What about other parts of the world where there are Islamic resurgences, such as in Kashmir, Chechnya, the Philippines, western China, etc.?  Don’t they have to be solved as well?


3. One of the main reasons why folks like OBL took up arms was because they felt that Islam was being threatened.  To them, the threats not only come from the “far enemy’ (the West in general and the US in particular), but also from the “near enemies” (the “apostate” governments of Saudi Arabia and Egypt).  Regardless of the resolution of Israeli issue, these will still be causes of war to the jihadis.

Are we losing or winning war against global terrorism? By the way do we really have war against global terrorism?

I am not sure if there is a “global terrorism.”  It is much too complex to think of it as one single force.  We may be able to manage one group or one set of ideas, but others will surely come up. Therefore, the question is not one of “winning,” it is more of “managing.”  If we disregard the deaths from 9/11 attacks as an aberration, the average death rates from international terrorism for the past 40 years is holding steady at about 370 per year.  In other words, the world has always lived with threats of terrorism and it will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

The Cost of Fighting Terrorism

Dipak K. Gupta

Often there seems to be an utter disconnect between actual threats of terrorism and the state response. In terms of cold numbers, the comparison between the probabilities of death from international terrorism, where the attackers come from outside of the country, with other real dangers seems almost absurd. In the past 38 years, the MIPT RAND Corporation database records on the average 375 deaths per year worldwide. This compares with roughly the same number of people who drown in bathtubs in the US alone (about 320). Even when we add the total fatalities during the past ten years resulting from both international and domestic terrorism, the number rises to nearly 32,700, which is less than the automobile related deaths for a single year in the United States. By comparing the number of terrorism killings with those from natural disasters like the recent tsunami in the South Asia and earthquake deaths in Pakistan, the national obsession with terrorism may indeed seem Kafa-esque.
Terrorism, by its very nature, is a mixture of violence and theater. It accomplishes its immediate goal by setting a time-honored trap. This trap is for an organized society to over react. The government of the target state responds predictably, particularly when it comes to international terrorism. Facing unexpected death and destruction perpetrated by foreign nationals -- however small compared to other calamities of life -- nations all over the world experience something akin to a collective post-traumatic stress syndrome. The made-for-television violence, magnified by the media deepens our collective sense of insecurity. In this condition of national paranoia, politicians vie for being the most hawkish against the threat. In the face of such a threat no price seems high enough. Although the costs of counter-terrorism varies from the moral consideration of killing innocent civilians as a part of collateral damage to the suspension of some of the most cherished rights of the individual, even the financial costs of overreaction from a strictly economic perspective seem overwhelming.
Facing an external threat, nations have always behaved in predictable ways. The assassination of the Austrian Arch Duke by a Serbian terrorist plunged the entire world into a catastrophic war just the same way the attacks of 9/11 have created a global crisis, when the US invaded Iraq as a part of a “broader war on terror.” Similarly, responding to the kidnapping of two of its soldiers by Hizbollah, Israel’s war in Lebanon seems to spiral out uncontrollably. The implications of these actions are yet to be fully realized or even understood.
Any action to counter the threat of terrorism carries its own cost. Let us look only at the monetary price of our involvement in Iraq.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the sole superpower quickly decided to invade Afghanistan and Iraq attempting to punish the guilty and protecting the American public from future attacks. In the process the costs of these and other counter-terrorism endeavor have piled up to an unprecedented level. According to the Congressional Research Service, the war effort itself has had a price tag of $409 billion dollars so far. To this astronomical sum, we must add the costs of homeland security undertaken not only by the federal government by also various state governments and even local governments. For instance, New York City, the prime target of the attacks has developed its own security force at cost of millions of dollars.
However, these costs are just the beginning. The heightened sense of insecurity in the US is spilling over on its borders on both sides of the country. Increased restrictions at the borders are costing billions in trade with Mexico and Canada, the biggest trade partner of the US. The fear of illegal immigrants is currently sweeping the country. Many are claiming that a secured border is essential as a safeguard against international terrorism, although there has not been a single reported case in North America or Europe, where illegal immigrants have taken part in terrorist attacks. Yet, this fear is propelling the US to embark on the construction of a wall sealing its border with Mexico. When asked about the price of this monumental project, an influential lawmaker commented, “Whatever it costs.”
If increased poverty and indignation make a volatile mix, our overreaction all over the world can only make us less secured in the long run. Indeed the cost of overreaction is adding up much more than is commonly understood. The possibility of disruption in oil supply is contributing to its rise in price. It is not only impacting those who can least afford it, but by transferring money to the most volatile regions of the world, where much of the oil is produced, it is propping up corrupt dictators, demagogues, and some of the most ardent benefactors of international terrorism.
These costs, however arduous, are not one-time expenditures. As governments attempt to punish the perpetrators they bring death and misery to the population, these, in turn, spawn more acts of terrorism. Thus, Sean MacStiofane, the former Provisional IRA;s Chief of Staff cynically noted: “… most revolutions are not caused by revolutionaries in the first place, but by the stupidity and brutality of governments.” Indeed the cycle of violence produces its own costs, tangible and intangible, for generations to come.
This is not to say that the threats of terrorism to global security are not real. The problem is that facing horrific acts of violence, we often lose our perspective and become eager to assume any cost, any consequence of our impulsive actions.
In a recent speech, Stephen Hawking, one of the most noted physicists of our time warned that the survival of our specie rests with our ability to manage violence in the next 100 years so that humankind can ultimately leave this planet and colonize other worlds. Given human nature and the consequent political, and economic realities, Hawking’s hope does indeed seem like a pie in the sky.

Bakunin Chomsky

“Bakunin Chomsky”

By assuming a fictitious character Bakunin Chomsky, Professor Jonathan Graubart delivered the following speech at the Fred J. Hansen/ Charles Hostler Lecture Series.

It’s a pleasure to be here: Thanks to Professor Gupta for inviting me to fill in for Prof. Graubart.      Please don’t confuse my views with Graubart’s. For all the FBI and Homeland Security informers in the audience, please just report my name. He is after all, untenured.
          
I’m Bakunin Chomsky, long-time political activist, freelance professor of law and IR, now based at the Emma Goldman Institute in San Cristobal, Mexico. My parents named me after one of the legendary 19th century Anarchists, Mikhail Bakunin. I’m in town for US-Mex celebrations of the 120th anniversary of the anarchist-led Haymarket demonstrations held in Chicago, May 4, 1886. Haymarket was a wildly successful demonstration of anarchist-led protests to improve daily working condition and social organizing of the workplace. The Haymarket demonstrations have since become the most celebrated event of worker solidarity in the globe, popularly known as May Day.

Interestingly, the one country in the world in which the Haymarket demonstrations of May, 1886 are not well known is the one where the events occurred, the USA. I decided then that my brief comments today on terrorism will touch on two other prominent terrorist events in US history that enjoy very little reflection here. The deeds of the great abolitionist John Brown in the period right before the Civil War and the US State’s dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Let me point out now, to avoid being lynched: I consider the 9/11 plane attacks a clear example of terrorism and one that merits wide condemnation.

My Point today: show a historical pattern whereby our gatekeepers in academia, the media, and governments apply a double standard toward Terrorism. Thus, Terrorism of the Weak that challenges the dominant Order is brutally condemned without any consideration of context while Terrorism of the Powerful is at best ignored and more often Praised.

I. Start with a Generic Def. Of Terrorism: My father Noam likes to refer to one given in 1980s by US Army: Calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature through intimidation, coercion, or instilling of fear.
     Implication: intended audience is not just immediate victims but a far broader one, maybe a whole society.  Ok, reasonable enough.
     
II. John Brown Example:
A. 19th Century Christian-socialist-feminist Abolitionist who had this crazy view that slavery was a moral obscenity. Concluded that nonviolent protest was not sufficient: slavery remained and slaveholders were well organized in killing and intimidating both slaves who threatened revolt and abolitionists seeking to end slavery through legislation.

B. Two famous deeds:
     1. Goes to “Bleeding Kansas” in 1856 where there is a battle over whether the territory will be a free or slave state. In response to series of lynchings carried out by slaveholder groups in territory, Brown leads a group that hacks to death five slaveholders. Pt: send a message to all slaveholders.

     2. Leads armed raid on US military base, Harpers’ Ferry, Virginia, 1858. Holds a group hostage with hopes of inspiring a mass slave revolt. This failed, Brown was captured and killed by the state.

C. Assessment: clearly terrorist: General view of all “responsible” politicians of time (including most Republicans) was to condemn Brown uncritically and not scrutinize the far more heinous and structural form of terrorism, known as slavery, that Brown and many others resisted.

D. But was Brown wrong? I submit it’s not an easy answer. You might think it accomplished nothing. But the close historical record suggests you are wrong. With the help of influential thinkers, like Henry David Thoreau, Brown’s actions become widely publicized and disseminated. This publicity likely both accelerated the start of the Civil War and pressured moderates in the Republican Party, like Lincoln, to demand the abolition of slavery as a condition for ending the war.
     Worthwhile to point out that although Brown is somewhat well known, he has long been considered a kook despite the overwhelming historical record that his actions were well thought out, occurred in a context of unspeakable atrocities backed by state authority.

II. Event 2: US Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, Aug 6, Aug 9, 1945:
A. Although these bombings are reasonably well known of in US history, there is very little commentary that points out that these are the two most heinous terrorist actions committed in world history. In Japan, the term “Ground Zero” has a very different meaning.

B. You have bombs that by design are meant to kill upward of a hundred thousand civilians. Hard to imagine a more flagrant condemnation of Laws on War Crimes.

C. Think about the Setting: Japan was effectively defeated. Only sticking point was whether surrender would be unconditional or not (meaning let Hirohito stay emperor). Hirohito, in fact, made overtures through Stalin to inform Truman of Japan’s willingness to surrender.

E. Truman and his Sec. Of War, James Byrnes refused the overtures. Why, they wanted to drop the atomic bombs. Why did they want to drop Atomic bombs? Not to hasten Japan’s surrender or save US lives. It was to send a message to USSR to back off in its own imperial ambitions to grab more of Europe and Asia.
     In other words: US govt ordered two consecutive bombs intended to kill hundreds of thousands of civilians to send a broader message of geopolitical intimidation to the USSR.
     Actual toll: 200 thou dead right away, another 100 thou over 5 years.
     After 2 bombings, Japan did surrender. US then allowed Japan to retain its emperor, which had supposedly been unacceptable before.

F. One would like to think such horrendous actions would have been condemned in the US: No, Americans wildly celebrated the “successful” mass terrorist murders of innocents in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even now, 61 years later, there has been shockingly little scrutiny of this most heinous action. Indeed, Truman is now worshipped, especially by our so-called opposition political party, the “fighting Dems” who say vote for us because we can wage war more effectively, like Wesley Clark),

III. Big Points About the War on Terror that Go beyond Brown and Hiroshima:
A. There is a Continued Pathological Unwillingness to Scrutinize Terrorist Actions of the Powerful: If anything we hear about how the US needs to be even more brutally terrorist to accomplish its objectives.  

B. At the UN, all the so-called antiterrrorist efforts are designed to back the US agenda.
     Thus the UNSC passed a binding resolution that requires all states to institute domestic policies that parallel the Patriot Act-led policies of the US.
     Moreover, the UN Sec Gen’l is pushing for a GA def of terrorism that limits terrorism to that committed by nonstate actors. The idea is then to allow the SC to interpret which actors are deemed terrorist; meaning the US and other great powers effectively decide for us.

C. This is Both Morally Abominable and has the effect of Increasing Both the Terrorism of the Strong and the Terrorism of the Weak.
      US, other powerful states, like Russia and China, and friends of the powerful, like Israel and Turkey, will feel unleashed to engage in state terror for their own “security” concerns.
      Such actions, will in turn increase desperation and misery in areas suffering from State Terror: Meaning they will turn to the retail terror of the weak, like blowing up synagogues, mosques, churches, making lethal weapons out of planes, trains, and buses.